As part of my analysis of the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, I've been looking into the "Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes" (Upper Canada, 1857), "An Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria" (Victoria [British Australia], 1869), "The Indian Act" (Canada, 1876) and the "Dawes Act" (United States, 1887).
While there have been studies to ascertain whether the Dawes Act was a direct influence on the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act (1899), these have been largely inconclusive. In my own research, I am avoiding the question of a direct casual link between these two particular laws, and am instead embedding the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act in a larger genealogy of interrelated legislation, particularly (though likely not limited to) in Anglophone settler colonies.
Below I will give a short overview of the four laws mentioned above and will make brief concluding remarks as to their similarities and differences to the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act and the significance of this. In my previous post, I went into some detail about the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act and it's relevance to Euro-American discourses of racial improvement and it's proto-'racial hygiene' discourse so these remarks in this post are intended to complement that analysis in preparation for a more comprehensive cross-comparison.
"Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes" (Upper Canada, 1857)
While not the earliest law of this nature, this law clearly demonstrates a number of key features present in the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, including the discourse of "protection" of so-called "Indians" itself. The key feature of this act is self-explanatory in the very name, however, it specifies that through being "civilized", "Indians" will see "the gradual removal of all legal distinctions between them and Her Majesty's other Canadian Subjects" and can thereby acquire the right to private property ownership. Critically, the path to enfranchisement is an examination by a missionary or a government commissioner "examines" a strictly male individual over 21 years of age in their ability to "speak, read and write either the english (
sic) or french (
sic) language readily and well", their being "sufficiently advanced in the elementary branches of education" and most importantly, perhaps, their being "of good moral character and free from debt". By being enfranchised as a British subject, the examined individual "shall no longer be deemed an Indian", which by implication would define "Indian" as an uncivilized person. This is similar to Francisco de Vitoria's prescription of Indians as unable to make "just war" and thereby not possessing sovereignty, which would imply that a sovereign Indian is no longer an Indian. It's actually stunning how similar this discourse is, albeit hundreds of years apart.
Another key feature of this law is that not fully "civilized" Indians could, if they "speak readily either the English or French language" and are "of sober and industrious habits, free from debt and sufficiently intelligent to be capable of managing his own affairs", they can report for inspection to the governor and can be put into a state of probation for three years after which they can be granted enfranchisement. Enfranchised former Indians are to be allotted a piece of land 50 acres or less and are given a "baptismal name" of their choosing. Any Indian attempting to 'pass' as enfranchised is to be jailed.
"An Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria" (Victoria, 1869)
This law, passed the year Hokkaido was annexed by the Japanese Empire, transformed Aborigines living in Victoria into wards of the state and assigned local committees as their "guardians". In doing so, these local guardians were to distribute "bedding clothing" (I assume bedding
and clothing) to be held on loan by Aborigines while remaining "the property of Her Majesty". Similarly, this law strictly limits the manner in which settlers can interact with Aborigines, particularly the sale of "intoxicating liquor". Finally, the act addresses the question of who is an "aboriginal native". Specifically, "aboriginal half-castes" and, ambiguously, children "habitually associating and living with aborigines" were deemed "aboriginals". In cases where the race of an individual is note clear, "the justice adjudicating may ... decide on his own view and judgement whether any person ... is or is not an aboriginal".
The apparent vagueness and briefness of this law, rather than resulting in a piece of legislation that was weak or impossible to apply, vested an incredible amount of power to make decisions on behalf of Aboriginal individuals or communities including the ability to decide on a person's race (which inevitably meant some Aborigines were decided white, and some whites may have been mistaken as Aboriginal). This also, seemingly in gross opposition to the Upper Canadian "Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes" seems to have limited the ability of Aborigines to hold property or engage freely in commerce with settlers, essentially disenfranchising them.
"Indian Act" (Canada, 1876)
By far the most comprehensive of the other laws analyzed here, the Indian Act describes in detail the "rights" and "privileges" granted by the Canadian state to Indigenous people on either formally ceded or unceded land (ie. land seized through treaties and land seized without treaties as
terra nullius). As the law is extremely detailed at 30 pages, I won't give a fully overview but will go over some relevant key points.
Similar to the Victorian law, the "Indian Act" allowed the state to reserve the right as to who and who is not Indigenous, though based on a "band" structure by which Indigenous people were by the act of government divided into groups and tied to particular pieces of government property (very) roughly corresponding to Indigenous people's national divisions and pre-colonization territorial boundaries. An "Indian" was explicitly defined as male, and an unmarried woman, despite her background, was only an "Indian" if she was married to one, and by implication, a settler woman who marries an Indigenous man becomes an "Indian", while an Indigenous woman immediately ceases to be Indigenous if she 'marries out'. In cases where the race of an individual is ambiguous, like the Victorian law, the "Superintendent-General or his agent" would decide the race of an individual or group. Perhaps most shockingly, in defining language used through the law, such as "reserve", "Indian lands", "intoxicants", "person" is defined as "an individual other than an Indian", which would seem to literally dehumanize Indigenous people in Canada while implicitly defining a person as by default a white person.
The key feature of this act is land and property. It was designed to assign "Indian bands" reserves which were subdivided into lots. Individual families were assigned lots and while they had no legal title to the lots, which remained public land, they could be compensated if they become "dispossessed" (passive form in text) if they have made "improvements". This is critical to 19th century assertions of property rights, developmentalism, and civilization, in that land would only become property if it was "improved", meaning exploited for financial gain. In areas where people lived, this would most commonly be through agriculture. So title could not be gained from "improvements", but some recognition of worth could, according to the Indian Act. However, occupants could not freely
sell products of the land, whether it was lumber or metals "other valuables", and could face heavy fines if found to be financially profiting off of their allotment. Lots themselves were formally managed by the Superintendent-General and could not be freely bought or sold, and in the case where the occupant died without an heir or family member to transfer the land to, it would be reverted to formal Crown land.
Similar to the "Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria", the "Indian Act" strictly regulated the sale of alcohol and moreover would give the state the right to jail those who are found intoxicated regardless of circumstance. While alcoholism is a complex and controversial subject both in Indigenous communities and in racist stereotyping of "Indians" today, this law and the "Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria" both echo fears that "Indians" or "native aborigines" need only alcohol to revert back to a "wild" state. Horace Capron himself says this in reference to Indigenous people who were ethnically cleansed from their own land that drink out of misery. And, according to Capron (who we obviously shouldn't trust as an objective voice in the matter) revert to a violent, barbaric state and could become a threat to white settlement. This also reflects larger temperance movements, where drunkenness was associated with the lower class, and proper Christian bourgeoisie was expressed through abstention. Common to both these laws was the vague, questionably attainable end goal of becoming fully fledged 'honorary whites' within colonial society, and it's undoubtable that in addition to stereotypes of barbarism, the ban on liquor was partly based on norms of "civilized" society.
Similar to the colonial-era Upper Canadian "Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes", "enfranchisement", granted to individuals that demonstrate a higher "degree of civilization" and displaying "the character for integrity, morality and sobriety" as judged by the Superintendent-General, legally defines them as non-Indians. Again, this consequentially defines "Indian" as someone showing a low degree of civilization, deceit, immorality, and drunkenness. Unlike the "Gradual Civilization" act, however, rules are defined for bands that wish to be collectively enfranchised, perhaps owing to the focus on the band system.
Finally, while there are specific sections of the law which bar trespassing or illegal logging, etc, this seems to have been based on the assumption that the land was formally Crown land and not specifically as protection of Indigenous people's property. This, I would argue, is the key point of this law, which is to clearly define "Indians", aside from all the other racist, dehumanizing descriptions, as those living in bands on government-administered reserves. Below, in reference to the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, I'll go into the relevance of tying Indigenous people to the state and to particular parcels of land.
"Dawes Act" (1887)
The last of the laws I've surveyed is the infamous "Dawes Act", which is strongly associated with the state's sale of Indigenous land to settlers. However, the act is similarly based on the process of dividing up reservations into allotments which were intended specifically for agriculture, with additional land allotted for "grazing purposes". The Indigenous occupants of these lands are put under a probationary period for 25 years, during which the land cannot be transferred or sold except to heirs. However, the United States government has the right to "negotiate" under conditions considered by the government "just an equitable" for the re-appropriation of the land. The land is then sold by the United States to "actual settlers". The money made from these sales was "subject to appropriation by Congress for the education and civilization of such tribe or tribes of Indians". These reservations were to be monitored by "Indian police". Preference for this job given to "those Indians who have availed themselves to the provisions of this act and [have] become citizens of the United States". As citizens, formally, reservation Indians were given formal "equal protection" of the law.
The second path to citizenship set out in the "Dawes Act" was Indians born in the United States but has "voluntarily taken up ... his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States".
However, similar to the "Indian Act", the "Dawes Act" reserves the right of the United States government to re-appropriate reservation land and privatized lots for public use with compensation.
Finally, in contrast to the "Indian Act", which served a similar function in every other regard, the "Dawes Act" clearly defined "Indians" as either a man or a woman irregardless of marital status.
Analysis
While the "Dawes Act" in particular has been often compared to the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, and sometimes considered the basis on which the latter was drafted, there are key differences between these two laws, or any of the two laws above. Differences, of course, were based upon the particular historical conditions the laws were drafted in over a 40 year period, as well as goals for the publicization and then settlement of Indigenous land in the particular settler colonial spaces. However, what all of these laws have in common is the legal framework connecting land use to level of civilization to (legal or literal) personhood. In this, they were all drafted for the same purpose and have strong similarities.
Moreover, particularly the "Dawes Act" and Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act base Indigenous land rights on their adoption of agriculture. This was the normative mode of living for the majority of people in the 19th century, so this was an assimilative gesture. This also, especially in Hokkaido where there was a zealous drive for development of Ainu as quickly as possible, effectively tried to force the Ainu to help in the colonization of their own land.
But perhaps most importantly, all of these laws transformed Indigenous people as wards of the state, holding a legal status similar to children. In this, they lacked legal personhood and could not hold property as a male settler in the same colony could, they could not consent, and while they were expected to make their own livelihoods as farmers, their well being was primarily decided by the state.
Ultimately, this was about the land and not people. By allotting Indigenous people small plots of land under the management of the state, and especially by having them perform tasks as normative probationary quasi-citizens, the great mass of Indigenous land that was stolen by settlers was, for the colonial state, legitimized. In other words, the very seemingly generous action of 'giving' the Indigenous groups land was based on the assumption that it was the settlers' land to give. All other lands were thereafter freely sold to settlers, and particularly with the Dawes Act, even the allotted lands were often sold by the state without the consent (which was legally impossible to give).
We also see race and gender to varying degrees being tied to the settler colonial state. As mentioned in a previous post, one of the things that blocked the first draft of the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act from passing was the ambiguity between Ainu and, to use Stephen Harper's phrase, 'old stock' settlers and anxiety that the wrong people would be indigenized/de-indigenized. And in the case of the Ainu, being Ainu was tied to family registers, and transferring one's registered place of domicile outside of an Ainu community would legally strip one of their being Ainu. In the Australian and Canadian settings, this was not the case, and questions of ambiguity were solved through arbitrary inclusion/exclusion of people into the Indigenous races and out of settler society, or vice versa, by white judges. And as a clue as to what might happen to mistakenly white-washed Indigenous people, or for that matter, "enfranchised" Indigenous people, we might look to Mark Winchester's analysis of Sasaki Masao's poetry and essays. Sasaki, an ethnic Ainu public school teacher with a Master's degree living far from his ancestral community on the Japanese mainland had, in every way that Katō Masanosuke or other Japanese policy planners might have hoped, 'assimilated' into mainstream Japanese society but nevertheless experienced regular racist harassment and exclusion from Japanese society. In this, the racism which is always both the condition and result of colonization deferred the very possibility of assimilation for Indigenous people, should they desire it. So in this, we should be suspicious of the promises of "enfranchisement" and look at concrete effects of assimilation policies and discourses.
Finally, curiously, the length of these laws varies considerably. The "Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization of the Indian Tribes", Act to Provide for the Protection and Management of the Aboriginal Natives of Victoria", and "Dawes Act", were all two or three pages. The "Indian Act" was 31 pages. The Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act is less than one page, type written. For as racist and sexist as the "Indian Act" was, I wonder if the aporias generated by sparse or ambiguous wording generate a state of exception by which the colonial authorities have more, not less, control over the affairs of Indigenous people over which they hold legal guardianship. In this, especially the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act was haphazard, and we learn from people, again, as racist as he was, like Oyabe Zenichiro that much of the law had yet to go into effect a decade later. More on this later.
Conclusion
There are undoubtedly many other similar laws which are part of interrelated/trans-colonial Indigenous management, though for their major differences, the goal was of course identical: the settlement of Indigenous land and legitimization of the settler presence. At this point, I don't think it's likely that Katō Masanosuke was specifically thinking about the "Dawes Act" when drafting the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, however, he wrote it in a context of a great proliferation of this sort of legislation.
Moreover, continuing my last post, what are the discursive conditions that lead to this sort of law-making. Was it the closing of the frontiers, was it humanist ideologies, was it the growing acceptance of the idea of a multiethnic empire? Or did it reflect biopolitical modes of population management as it developed during the 19th century?